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Time-consistent stopping under decreasing impatience∗
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Under non-exponential discounting, we develop a dynamic theory for stopping problems
in continuous time. Our framework covers discount functions that induce decreasing impa-
tience. Due to the inherent time inconsistency, we look for equilibrium stopping policies,
formulated as fixed points of an operator. Under appropriate conditions, fixed-point itera-
tions converge to equilibrium stopping policies. This iterative approach corresponds to the
hierarchy of strategic reasoning in Game Theory, and provides “agent-specific” results: it
assigns one specific equilibrium stopping policy to each agent according to her initial behav-
ior. In particular, it leads to a precise mathematical connection between the naive behavior
and the sophisticated one. Our theory is illustrated in a real options model.
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1 Introduction
Time inconsistency is known to exist in stopping decisions, such as casino gambling in [1] and
[10], optimal stock liquidation in [34], and real options valuation in [14]. A general treatment,
however, has not been proposed in continuous-time models. In this article, we develop a dy-
namic theory for time-inconsistent stopping problems in continuous time, under non-exponential
discounting. In particular, we focus on log sub-additive discount functions (Assumption 3.1),
which capture decreasing impatience, an acknowledged feature of empirical discounting in Be-
havioral Economics; see e.g. [33], [19], and [18]. Hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discount
functions are special cases under our consideration.
The seminal work Strotz [31] identifies three types of agents under time inconsistency – the
naive, the pre-committed, and the sophisticated. Among them, only the sophisticated agent
takes the possible change of future preferences seriously, and works on consistent planning: she
aims to find a strategy that once being enforced over time, none of her future selves would
want to deviate from it. How to precisely formulate such a sophisticated strategy had been
a challenge in continuous time. For stochastic control, Ekeland and Lazrak [11] resolved this
issue by defining sophisticated controls as subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in a continuous-time
inter-temporal game of multiple selves. This has aroused vibrant research on time inconsistency
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in mathematical finance; see e.g. [13], [12], [15], [35], [6], [9], [5], and [4]. There is, nonetheless,
no equivalent development for stopping problems.
This paper contributes to the literature of time inconsistency in three ways. First, we provide
a precise definition of sophisticated stopping policy (or, equilibrium stopping policy) in contin-
uous time (Definition 3.2). Specifically, we introduce the operator Θ in (3.7), which describes
the game-theoretic reasoning of a sophisticated agent. Sophisticated policies are formulated as
fixed points of Θ, which connects to the concept of subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium invoked
in [11].
Second, we introduce a new, iterative approach for finding equilibrium strategies. For any
initial stopping policy τ , we apply the operator Θ to τ repetitively until it converges to an
equilibrium stopping policy. Under appropriate conditions, this fixed-point iteration indeed
converges (Theorem 3.1), which is the main result of this paper. Recall that the standard
approach for finding equilibrium strategies in continuous time is solving a system of non-linear
equations, as proposed in [13] and [4]. Solving this system of equations is difficult; and even when
it is solved (as in the special cases in [13] and [4]), we only obtain one particular equilibrium,
and it is unclear how other equilibrium strategies can be found. Our iterative approach can be
useful here: we find different equilibria simply by starting the fixed-point iteration with different
initial strategies τ . In some cases, we are able to find all equilibria; see Proposition 4.2.
Third, when an agent starts to do game-theoretic reasoning and look for equilibrium strate-
gies, she is not satisfied with an arbitrary equilibrium. Instead, she works on improving her
initial strategy to turn it into an equilibrium. This improving process is absent from [11], [13],
[4], and subsequent research, although well-known in Game Theory as the hierarchy of strategic
reasoning in [29] and [30]. Our iterative approach specifically represents this improving pro-
cess: for any initial strategy τ , each application of Θ to τ corresponds to an additional level
of strategic reasoning. As a result, the iterative approach complements the existing literature
of time inconsistency in that it not only facilitates the search for equilibrium strategies, but
provides “agent-specific” equilibria: it assigns one specific equilibrium to each agent according
to her initial behavior.
Upon completion of our paper, we noticed the recent work Pedersen and Peskir [25] on
mean-variance optimal stopping. They introduced “dynamic optimality” to deal with time in-
consistency. As explained in detail in [25], this new concept is different from consistent planning
in Strotz [31], and does not rely on game-theoretic modeling. Therefore, our equilibrium stop-
ping policies are different from their dynamically optimal stopping times. That being said, a
few connections between our paper and [25] do exist, as pointed out in Remarks 2.2, 3.2, and
4.4.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the setup of our model,
and demonstrate time inconsistency in stopping decisions through examples. In Section 3,
we formulate the concept of equilibrium for stopping problems in continuous time, search for
equilibrium strategies via fixed-point iterations, and establish the required convergence result.
Section 4 illustrates our theory thoroughly in a real options model. Most of the proofs are
delegated to appendices.
2 Preliminaries and Motivation
Consider the canonical space Ω := {ω ∈ C([0,∞);Rd) : ω0 = 0}. Let {Wt}t≥0 be the coordinate
mapping process Wt(ω) = ωt, and F
W = {FWs }s≥0 be the natural filtration generated by W .
Let P be the Wiener measure on (Ω,FW∞ ), where FW∞ :=
⋃
s≥0FWs . For each t ≥ 0, we introduce
the filtration Ft,W = {F t,Ws }s≥0 with
F t,Ws = σ(Wu∨t −Wt : 0 ≤ u ≤ s),
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and let Ft = {F ts}s≥0 be the P-augmentation of Ft,W . We denote by Tt the collection of all
Ft-stopping times τ with τ ≥ t a.s. For the case where t = 0, we simply write F0 = {F0s }s≥0 as
Fs = {Fs}s≥0, and T0 as T .
Remark 2.1. For any 0 ≤ s ≤ t, F ts is the σ-algebra generated by only the P-negligible sets.
Moreover, for any s, t ≥ 0, F ts-measurable random variables are independent of Ft; see Bouchard
and Touzi [8, Remark 2.1] for a similar set-up.
Consider the space X := [0,∞) × Rd, equipped with the Borel σ-algebra B(X). Let X be a
continuous-time Markov process given by Xs := f(s,Ws), s ≥ 0, for some measurable function
f : X 7→ R. Or, more generally, for any τ ∈ T and Rd-valued Fτ -measurable ξ, let X be the
solution to the stochastic differential equation
(2.1) dXt = b(t,Xt)dt+ σ(t,Xt)dWt for t ≥ τ, with Xτ = ξ a.s.
We assume that b : X 7→ R and σ : X 7→ R satisfy Lipschitz and linear growth conditions in
x ∈ Rd, uniformly in t ∈ [0,∞). Then, for any τ ∈ T and Rd-valued Fτ -measurable ξ with
E[|ξ|2] <∞, (2.1) admits a unique strong solution.
For any (t, x) ∈ X, we denote by Xt,x the solution to (2.1) with Xt = x, and by Et,x the
expectation conditioned on Xt = x.
2.1 Classical Optimal Stopping
Consider a payoff function g : Rd 7→ R, assumed to be nonnegative and continuous, and a
discount function δ : R+ 7→ [0, 1], assumed to be continuous, decreasing, and satisfy δ(0) = 1.
Moreover, we assume that
(2.2) Et,x
[
sup
t≤s≤∞
δ(s − t)g(Xs)
]
<∞, ∀(t, x) ∈ X,
where we interpret δ(∞− t)g(Xt,x∞ ) := lim sups→∞ δ(s− t)g(Xt,xs ); this is in line with Karatzas
and Shreve [16, Appendix D]. Given (t, x) ∈ X, classical optimal stopping concerns if there is a
τ ∈ Tt such that the expected discounted payoff
(2.3) J(t, x; τ) := Et,x [δ(τ − t)g(Xτ )]
can be maximized. The associated value function
(2.4) v(t, x) := sup
τ∈Tt
J(t, x; τ)
has been widely studied, and the existence of an optimal stopping time is affirmative. The
following is a standard result taken from [16, Appendix D] and [26, Chapter I.2].
Proposition 2.1. For any (t, x) ∈ X, let {Zt,xs }s≥t be a right-continuous process with
(2.5) Zt,xs (ω) = ess sup
τ∈Ts
Es,X
t,x
s (ω)[δ(τ − t)g(Xτ )] a.s. ∀s ≥ t,
and define τ˜t,x ∈ Tt by
τ˜t,x := inf
{
s ≥ t : δ(s − t)g(Xt,xs ) = Zt,xs
}
.(2.6)
Then, τ˜t,x is an optimal stopping time of (2.4), i.e.
(2.7) J(t, x; τ˜t,x) = sup
τ∈Tt
J(t, x; τ).
Moreover, τ˜t,x is the smallest, if not unique, optimal stopping time.
Remark 2.2. The classical optimal stopping problem (2.4) is static in the sense that it involves
only the preference of the agent at time t. Following the terminology of Definition 1 in Pedersen
and Peskir [25], τ˜t,x in (2.6) is “statically optimal”.
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2.2 Time Inconsistency
Following Strotz [31], a naive agent solves the classical problem (2.4) repeatedly at every moment
as time passes by. That is, given initial (t, x) ∈ X, the agent solves
sup
τ∈Ts
J(s,Xt,xs ; τ) at every moment s ≥ t.
By Proposition 2.1, the agent at time s intends to employ the stopping time τ˜s,Xt,xs ∈ Ts, for
all s ≥ t. This raises the question of whether optimal stopping times obtained at different
moments, τ˜t,x and τ˜t′,Xt,x
t′
with t′ > t, are consistent with each other.
Definition 2.1 (Time Consistency). The problem (2.4) is time-consistent if for any (t, x) ∈ X
and s > t, τ˜t,x(ω) = τ˜s,Xt,xs (ω)(ω) for a.e. ω ∈ {τ˜t,x ≥ s}. We say the problem (2.4) is time-
inconsistent if the above does not hold.
In the classical literature of Mathematical Finance, the discount function usually takes the
form δ(s) = e−ρs for some ρ ≥ 0. This already guarantees time consistency of (2.4). To see
this, first observe the identity
(2.8) δ(s)δ(t) = δ(s + t) ∀s, t ≥ 0.
Fix (t, x) ∈ X and pick t′ > t such that P[τ˜t,x ≥ t′] > 0. For a.e. ω ∈ {τ˜t,x ≥ t′}, set y := Xt,xt′ (ω).
We observe from (2.6), (2.5), and Xt,xs (ω) = X
t′,y
s (ω) that
τ˜t,x(ω) = inf
{
s ≥ t′ : δ(s − t)g(Xt′,ys (ω)) ≥ ess sup
τ∈Ts
Es,X
t′,y
s (ω)[δ(τ − t)g(Xτ )]
}
,
τ˜t′,y(ω) = inf
{
s ≥ t′ : δ(s − t′)g(Xt′ ,ys (ω)) ≥ ess sup
τ∈Ts
Es,X
t′,y
s (ω)[δ(τ − t′)g(Xτ )]
}
.
Then (2.8) guarantees τ˜t,x(ω) = τ˜t′,y(ω), as
δ(τ−t)
δ(s−t) =
δ(τ−t′)
δ(s−t′) = δ(τ − s). For non-exponential
discount functions, the identity (2.8) no longer holds, and the problem (2.4) is in general time-
inconsistent.
Example 2.1 (Smoking Cessation). Suppose a smoker has a fixed lifetime T > 0. Consider
a deterministic cost process Xs := x0e
1
2
s, s ∈ [0, T ], for some x0 > 0. Thus, we have Xt,xs =
xe
1
2
(s−t) for s ∈ [t, T ]. The smoker can (i) quit smoking at some time s < T (with cost Xs)
and die peacefully at time T (with no cost), or (ii) never quit smoking (thus incurring no cost)
but die painfully at time T (with cost XT ). With hyperbolic discount function δ(s) :=
1
1+s for
s ≥ 0, (2.4) becomes minimizing cost
inf
s∈[t,T ]
δ(s − t)Xt,xs = inf
s∈[t,T ]
xe
1
2
(s−t)
1 + (s− t) .
By basic Calculus, the optimal stopping time τ˜t,x is given by
(2.9) τ˜t,x =
{
t+ 1 if t < T − 1,
T if t ≥ T − 1.
Time inconsistency can be easily observed, and it illustrates the procrastination behavior: the
smoker never quits smoking.
Example 2.2 (Real Options Model). Suppose d = 1 and Xs := |Ws|, s ≥ 0. Consider the
payoff function g(x) := x for x ∈ R+ and the hyperbolic discount function δ(s) := 11+s for
4
s ≥ 0. The problem (2.4) reduces to v(x) = supτ∈T Ex
[
Xτ
1+τ
]
. This can be viewed as a real
options problem in which the management of a large non-profitable insurance company has the
intention to liquidate or sell the company, and would like to decide when to do so; see the
explanations under (4.2) for details.
By the argument in Pedersen and Peskir [24], we prove in Proposition 4.1 below that the
optimal stopping time τ˜x, defined in (2.6) with t = 0, has the formula
τ˜x = inf
{
s ≥ 0 : Xxs ≥
√
1 + s
}
.
If one solves the same problem at time t > 0 with Xt = x ∈ R+, the optimal stopping time is
τ˜t,x = t+ τ˜x = inf{s ≥ t : Xt,xs ≥
√
1 + (s− t)}. The free boundary s 7→√1 + (s− t) is unusual
in its dependence on initial time t. From Figure 1, we clearly observe time inconsistency:
τ˜t,x(ω) and τ˜t′,Xt,x
t′
(ω) do not agree in general, for any t′ > t, as they correspond to different
free boundaries.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
0
1
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4
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Figure 1: The free boundary s 7→√1 + (s− t) with different initial times t.
As proposed in Strotz [31], to deal with time inconsistency, we need a strategy that is
either pre-committed or sophisticated. A pre-committed agent finds τ˜t,x in (2.6) at time t, and
forces her future selves to follow τ˜t,x through a commitment mechanism (e.g. a contract). By
contrast, a sophisticated agent works on “consistent planning”: she anticipates the change of
future preferences, and aims to find a stopping strategy that once being enforced, none of her
future selves would want to deviate from it. How to precisely formulate sophisticated stopping
strategies has been a challenge in continuous time, and the next section focuses on resolving
this.
3 Equilibrium Stopping Policies
3.1 Objective of a Sophisticated Agent
Since one may re-evaluate and change her choice of stopping times over time, her stopping
strategy is not a single stopping time, but a stopping policy defined below.
Definition 3.1. A Borel measurable function τ : X 7→ {0, 1} is called a stopping policy. We
denote by T (X) the set of all stopping policies.
Given current time and state (t, x) ∈ X, a policy τ ∈ T (X) governs when an agent stops:
the agent stops at the first time τ(s,Xt,xs ) yields the value 0, i.e. at the moment
Lτ(t, x) := inf {s ≥ t : τ(s,Xt,xs ) = 0} .(3.1)
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To show that Lτ(t, x) is a well-defined stopping time, we introduce the set
(3.2) ker(τ) := {(t, x) ∈ X : τ(t, x) = 0}.
It is called the kernel of τ , which is the collection of (t, x) at which the policy τ suggests
immediate stopping. Then, Lτ(t, x) can be expressed as
(3.3) Lτ(t, x) = inf {s ≥ t : (s,Xt,xs ) ∈ ker(τ)} .
Lemma 3.1. For any τ ∈ T (X) and (t, x) ∈ X, ker(τ) ∈ B(X) and Lτ(t, x) ∈ Tt.
Proof. The Borel measurability of τ ∈ T (X) immediately implies ker(τ) ∈ B(X). In view of
(3.3), Lτ(t, x)(ω) = inf {s ≥ t : (s, ω) ∈ E}, where
E := {(r, ω) ∈ [t,∞)× Ω : (r,Xt,xr (ω)) ∈ ker(τ)}.
With ker(τ) ∈ B(X) and the process Xt,x being progressively measurable, E is a progressively
measurable set. Since the filtration Ft satisfies the usual conditions, [2, Theorem 2.1] asserts
that Lτ(t, x) is an Ft-stopping time.
Remark 3.1 (Naive Stopping Policy). Recall the optimal stopping time τ˜t,x defined in (2.6) for
all (t, x) ∈ X. Define τ˜ ∈ T (X) by
(3.4) τ˜(t, x) :=
{
0, if τ˜t,x = t,
1, if τ˜t,x > t.
Note that τ˜ : X 7→ {0, 1} is indeed Borel measurable because τ˜t,x = t if and only if
(t, x) ∈
{
(t, x) ∈ X : g(x) = sup
τ∈Tt
Et,x[δ(τ − t)g(Xτ )]
}
∈ B(X).
Following the standard terminology (see e.g. [31], [27]), we call τ˜ the naive stopping policy as
it describes the behavior of a naive agent, discussed in Subsection 2.2.
Remark 3.2. Despite its name, the naive stopping policy τ˜ may readily satisfy certain opti-
mality criterion. For example, “dynamic optimality” recently proposed in Pedersen and Peskir
[25] can be formulated in our case as follows: τ ∈ T (X) is dynamically optimal if there is no
other π ∈ T (X) such that
Pt,x
[
J
(
Lτ(t, x),Xt,xLτ(t,x);Lπ
(
Lτ(t, x),Xt,xLτ(t,x)
))
> g(Xt,xLτ(t,x))
]
> 0
for some (t, x) ∈ X. By (3.4) and Proposition 2.1, τ˜ is dynamically optimal as the above
probability is always 0.
Example 3.1 (Real Options Model, Continued). Recall the setting of Example 2.2. A naive
agent follows τ˜ ∈ T (X), and the actual moment of stopping is
Lτ˜(t, x) = inf{s ≥ t : τ˜(s,Xt,xs ) = 0} = inf{s ≥ t : Xt,xs ≥ 1},
which differs from the agent’s original decision τ˜t,x in Example 2.2.
We can now introduce equilibrium policies. Suppose that a stopping policy τ ∈ T (X) is
given to a sophisticated agent. At any (t, x) ∈ X, the agent carries out the game-theoretic
reasoning: “assuming that all my future selves will follow τ ∈ T (X), what is the best stopping
strategy at current time t in response to that?” Note that the agent at time t has only two
possible actions: stopping and continuation. If she stops at time t, she gets g(x) immediately. If
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she continues at time t, given that all her future selves will follow τ ∈ T (X), she will eventually
stop at the moment
L∗τ(t, x) := inf {s > t : τ(s,Xt,xs ) = 0}
= inf
{
s > t : (s,Xt,xs ) ∈ ker(τ)
}
,
(3.5)
leading to the payoff
J(t, x;L∗τ(t, x)) = Et,x [δ(L∗τ(t, x)− t)g(XL∗τ(t,x))] .
By the same argument in Lemma 3.1, L∗τ(t, x) is a well-defined stopping time in Tt. Note the
subtle difference between Lτ(t, x) and L∗τ(t, x): with the latter, the agent at time t simply
chooses to continue, with no regard to what τ ∈ T (X) suggests at time t. This is why we have
“s > t” in (3.5), instead of “s ≥ t” in (3.1).
Now, we separate the space X into three distinct regions
Sτ := {(t, x) ∈ X : g(x) > J(t, x;L∗τ(t, x))},
Cτ := {(t, x) ∈ X : g(x) < J(t, x;L∗τ(t, x))},
Iτ := {(t, x) ∈ X : g(x) = J(t, x;L∗τ(t, x))}.
(3.6)
Some conclusions can be drawn:
1. If (t, x) ∈ Sτ , the agent should stop immediately at time t.
2. If (t, x) ∈ Cτ , the agent should continue at time t.
3. If (t, x) ∈ Iτ , the agent is indifferent between stopping and continuation at current time;
there is then no incentive for the agent to deviate from the originally assigned stopping
strategy τ(t, x).
To summarize, for any (t, x) ∈ X, the best stopping strategy at current time (in response to
future selves following τ ∈ T (X)) is
(3.7) Θτ(t, x) :=

0 for (t, x) ∈ Sτ
1 for (t, x) ∈ Cτ
τ(t, x) for (t, x) ∈ Iτ .
.
The next result shows that Θτ : X 7→ {0, 1} is again a stopping policy.
Lemma 3.2. For any τ ∈ T (X), Sτ , Cτ , and Iτ belong to B(X), and Θτ ∈ T (X).
Proof. Since L∗τ(t, x) is the first hitting time to the Borel set ker(τ), the map (t, x) 7→
J(t, x;L∗τ(t, x)) = Et,x[δ(L∗τ(t, x) − t)g(XL∗τ(t,x))] is Borel measurable, and thus Sτ , Iτ , and
Cτ all belong to B(X). Now, by (3.7), ker(Θτ) = Sτ ∪ (Iτ ∩ ker(τ)) ∈ B(X), which implies that
Θτ ∈ T (X).
By Lemma 3.2, Θ can be viewed as an operator acting on the space T (X). For any initial
τ ∈ T (X), Θ : T (X) 7→ T (X) generates a new policy Θτ ∈ T (X). The switch from τ to Θτ
corresponds to an additional level of strategic reasoning in Game Theory, as discussed below
Corollary 3.1.
Definition 3.2 (Equilibrium Stopping Policies). We say τ ∈ T (X) is an equilibrium stopping
policy if Θτ(t, x) = τ(t, x) for all (t, x) ∈ X. We denote by E(X) the collection of all equilibrium
stopping policies.
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The term “equilibrium” is used as a connection to subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in an
inter-temporal game among current self and future selves. This equilibrium idea was invoked
in stochastic control under time inconsistency; see e.g. [11], [13], [12], and [5]. A contrast with
the stochastic control literature needs to be pointed out.
Remark 3.3 (Comparison with Stochastic Control). In time-inconsistent stochastic control,
local perturbation of strategies on small time intervals [t, t + ε] is the standard way to define
equilibrium controls. In our case, local perturbation is carried out instantaneously at time t.
This is because an instantaneously-modified stopping strategy may already change the expected
discounted payoff significantly, whereas a control perturbed only at time t yields no effect.
The first question concerning Definition 3.2 is the existence of an equilibrium stopping policy.
Finding at least one such a policy turns out to be easy.
Remark 3.4 (Trivial Equilibrium). Define τ ∈ T (X) by τ(t, x) := 0 for all (t, x) ∈ X. Then
Lτ(t, x) = L∗τ(t, x) = t, and thus J(t, x;L∗τ(t, x)) = g(x) for all (t, x) ∈ X. This implies
Iτ = X. We then conclude from (3.7) that Θτ(t, x) = τ(t, x) for all (t, x) ∈ X, which shows
τ ∈ E(X). We call it the trivial equilibrium stopping policy.
Example 3.2 (Smoking Cessation, Continued). Recall the setting in Example 2.1. Observe
from (2.9) and (3.4) that L∗τ˜(t, x) = T for all (t, x) ∈ X. Then,
δ(L∗τ˜(t, x)− t)Xt,xL∗τ˜(t,x) =
Xt,xT
1 + T − t =
xe
1
2
(T−t)
1 + T − t .
Since e
1
2
s = 1 + s has two solutions s = 0 and s = s∗ ≈ 2.51286, and e 12s > 1 + s iff s > s∗,
the above equation implies Sτ˜ = {(t, x) : t < T − s∗}, Cτ˜ = {(t, x) : t ∈ (T − s∗, T )}, and
Iτ˜ = {(t, x) : t = T − s∗ or T}. We therefore get
Θτ˜(t, x) =
{
0 for t < T − s∗,
1 for t ≥ T − s∗.
Whereas a naive smoker delays quitting smoking indefinitely (as in Example 2.1), the first level
of strategic reasoning (i.e. applying Θ to τ˜ once) recognizes this procrastination behavior and
pushes the smoker to quit immediately, unless he is already too old (i.e. t ≥ T − s∗). It can be
checked that Θτ˜ is already an equilibrium, i.e. Θ2τ˜(t, x) = Θτ˜(t, x) for all (t, x) ∈ X.
It is worth noting that in the classical case of exponential discounting, characterized by
(2.8), the naive stopping policy τ˜ in (3.4) is already an equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1. Under (2.8), τ˜ ∈ T (X) defined in (3.4) belongs to E(X).
Proof. The proof is delegated to Appendix A.1.
3.2 The Main Result
In this subsection, we look for equilibrium policies through fixed-point iterations. For any
τ ∈ T (X), we apply Θ to τ repetitively until we reach an equilibrium policy. In short, we define
τ0 by
(3.8) τ0(t, x) := lim
n→∞Θ
nτ(t, x) ∀(t, x) ∈ X,
and take it as a candidate equilibrium policy. To make this argument rigorous, we need to show
(i) the limit in (3.8) converges, so that τ0 is well-defined; (ii) τ0 is indeed an equilibrium policy,
i.e. Θτ0 = τ0. To this end, we impose the condition:
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Assumption 3.1. The function δ satisfies δ(s)δ(t) ≤ δ(s + t) for all s, t ≥ 0.
Assumption 3.1 is closely related to decreasing impatience (DI) in Behavioral Economics.
It is well-documented in empirical studies, e.g. [33], [19], [18], that people admits DI: when
choosing between two rewards, people are more willing to wait for the larger reward (more
patient) when these two rewards are further away in time. For instance, in the two scenarios
(i) getting $100 today or $110 tomorrow, and (ii) getting $100 in 100 days or $110 in 101 days,
people tend to choose $100 in (i), but $110 in (ii).
Following [28, Definition 1] and [20], [21], DI can be formulated under current context as
follows: the discount function δ induces DI if
(3.9) for any s ≥ 0, t 7→ δ(t+ s)
δ(t)
is strictly increasing.
Observe that (3.9) readily implies Assumption 3.1, as δ(t + s)/δ(t) ≥ δ(s)/δ(0) = δ(s) for all
s, t ≥ 0. That is, Assumption 3.1 is automatically true under DI. Note that Assumption 3.1
is more general than DI, as it obviously includes the classical case of exponential discounting,
characterized by (2.8).
The main convergence result for (3.8) is the following:
Proposition 3.2. Let Assumption 3.1 hold. If τ ∈ T (X) satisfies
(3.10) ker(τ) ⊆ ker(Θτ),
then
(3.11) ker(Θnτ) ⊆ ker(Θn+1τ), ∀n ∈ N.
Hence, τ0 in (3.8) is a well-defined element in T (X), with ker(τ0) =
⋃
n∈N ker(Θ
nτ).
Proof. The proof is delegated to Appendix A.2.
Condition (3.10) means that at any (t, x) ∈ X where the initial policy τ indicates immediate
stopping, the new policy Θτ agrees with it; however, it is possible that at some (t, x) ∈ X
where τ indicates continuation, Θτ suggests immediate stopping, based on the game-theoretic
reasoning in Subsection 3.1. Note that (3.10) is not very restrictive, as it already covers all
hitting times to subsets of X that are open (or more generally, half-open in [0,∞) and open in
Rd), as explained below.
Remark 3.5. Let E be a subset of X that is “open” in the sense that for any (t, x) ∈ E, there
exists ε > 0 such that (t, x) ∈ [t, t + ε) × Bε(x) ⊆ E, where Bε(x) := {y ∈ Rd : |y − x| < ε}.
Define τ ∈ T (X) by τ(t, x) = 0 if and only if (t, x) ∈ E. Since ker(τ) = E is “open”, for any
(t, x) ∈ ker(τ), we have L∗τ(t, x) = t, which implies (t, x) ∈ Iτ . Thus, ker(τ) ⊆ Iτ . It follows
that (3.10) holds, as ker(τ) ⊆ Sτ ∪ker(τ) = Sτ ∪ (Iτ ∩ker(τ)) = ker(Θτ), where the last equality
is due to (3.7).
The stopping policy τ corresponds to the stopping times Tt,x := inf{s ≥ t : (s,Xt,xs ) ∈ E} for
all (t, x) ∈ X. In particular, if E = [0,∞)×F where F is an open set in Rd, the corresponding
stopping times are T ′t,x := inf{s ≥ t : Xt,xs ∈ F}, (t, x) ∈ X.
Moreover, the naive stopping policy τ˜ also satisfies (3.10).
Proposition 3.3. τ˜ ∈ T (X) defined in (3.4) satisfies (3.10).
Proof. The proof is delegated to Appendix A.3.
The next theorem is the main result of our paper. It shows that the fixed-point iteration in
(3.8) indeed converges to an equilibrium policy.
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Theorem 3.1. Let Assumption 3.1 hold. If τ ∈ T (X) satisfies (3.10), then τ0 defined in (3.8)
belongs to E(X).
Proof. The proof is delegated to Section A.4.
The following result for the naive stopping policy τ˜ , defined in (3.4), is a direct consequence
of Proposition 3.3 and Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.1. Let Assumption 3.1 hold. The stopping policy τ˜0 ∈ T (X) defined by
(3.12) τ˜0(t, x) := lim
n→∞Θ
nτ˜(t, x) ∀(t, x) ∈ X
belongs to E(X).
Our iterative approach, as in (3.8), contributes to the literature of time inconsistency in
two ways. First, the standard approach for finding equilibrium strategies in continuous time is
solving a system of non-linear equations (the so-called extended HJB equation), as proposed in
[13] and [4]. Solving this system of equations is difficult; and even when it is solved (as in the
special cases in [13] and [4]), we just obtain one particular equilibrium, and it is unclear how
other equilibrium strategies can be found. Our iterative approach provides a potential remedy
here. We can find different equilibria simply by starting the iteration (3.8) with different initial
policies τ ∈ T (X). In some cases, we are able to find all equilibria, and obtain a complete
characterization of E(X); see Proposition 4.2 below.
Second, while the continuous-time formulation of equilibrium strategies was initiated in [11],
the “origin” of an equilibrium strategy has not been addressed. This question is important as
people do not start with using equilibrium strategies. People have their own initial strategies,
determined by a variety of factors such as classical optimal stopping theory, personal habits,
and popular rules of thumb in the market. Once an agent starts to do game-theoretic reasoning
and look for equilibrium strategies, she is not satisfied with an arbitrary equilibrium. Instead,
she works on improving her initial strategy to turn it into an equilibrium. This improving
process is absent from [11], [13], and [4], but it is in fact well-known in Game Theory as
the hierarchy of strategic reasoning in [29] and [30]. Our iterative approach embodies this
framework: given an initial τ ∈ T (X), Θnτ ∈ T (X) corresponds to level-n strategic reasoning
in [30], and τ0 := limn→∞Θnτ reflects full rationality of “smart∞” players in [29]. Hence, our
formulation complements the literature of time inconsistency in that it not only defines what
an equilibrium is, but explains where an equilibrium is coming from. This in turn provides
“agent-specific” results: it assigns one specific equilibrium to each agent according to her initial
behavior.
In particular, Corollary 3.1 specifies the connection between the naive behavior and the
sophisticated one. While these behaviors have been widely discussed in the literature, their
relation has not been stated mathematically as precisely as in (3.12).
3.3 The Time-Homogeneous Case
Suppose the state process X is time-homogeneous, i.e. Xs = f(Ws) for some measurable
f : Rd 7→ R; or, the coefficients b and σ in (2.1) does not depend on t. The objective function
(2.3) then reduces to J(x; τ) := Ex[δ(τ)g(Xτ )] for x ∈ Rd and τ ∈ T , where the superscript of
Ex means X0 = x. The decision to stop or to continue then depends on the current state x
only. The formulation in Subsection 3.1 reduces to:
Definition 3.3. When X is time-homogeneous, a Borel measurable τ : Rd 7→ {0, 1} is called
a stopping policy, and we denote by T (Rd) the set of all stopping policies. Given τ ∈ T (Rd)
and x ∈ Rd, we define, similarly to (3.2), (3.1), and (3.5), ker(τ) := {x ∈ Rd : τ(x) = 0},
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Lτ(x) := inf{t ≥ 0 : τ(Xxt ) = 0}, and L∗τ(x) := inf{t > 0 : τ(Xxt ) = 0}. Furthermore, we say
τ ∈ T (Rd) is an equilibrium stopping policy if Θτ(x) = τ(x) for all x ∈ Rd, where
(3.13) Θτ(x) :=

0 if x ∈ Sτ := {x : g(x) > Ex[δ(L∗τ(x))g(XL∗τ(x))]},
1 if x ∈ Cτ := {x : g(x) < Ex[δ(L∗τ(x))g(XL∗τ(x))]},
τ(x) if x ∈ Iτ := {x : g(x) = Ex[δ(L∗τ(x))g(XL∗τ(x))]}.
Remark 3.6. When X is time-homogeneous, all the results in Subsection 3.2 hold, with T (X),
E(X), ker(τ), and Θ replaced by the corresponding ones in Definition 3.3. Proofs of these state-
ments are similar to, and in fact easier than, those in Subsection 3.2, thanks to the homogeneity
in time.
4 A Detailed Case Study: Stopping of BES(1)
In this section, we recall the setup of Example 2.2, with hyperbolic discount function
(4.1) δ(s) :=
1
1 + βs
∀s ≥ 0,
where β > 0 is a fixed parameter. The state process X is a one-dimensional Bessel process,
i.e. Xt = |Wt|, t ≥ 0, where W is a one-dimensional Brownian motion. With X being time-
homogeneous, we will follow Definition 3.3 and Remark 3.6. Also, the classical optimal stopping
problem (2.4) reduces to
(4.2) v(x) = sup
τ∈T
Ex
[
Xτ
1 + βτ
]
for x ∈ R+.
This can be viewed as a real options problem, as explained below.
By [32] and the references therein, when the surplus (or reserve) of an insurance company
is much larger than the size of each individual claim, the dynamics of the surplus process can
be approximated by dRt = µdt+ σdWt with µ = p− E[Z] and σ =
√
E[Z2]. Here, p > 0 is the
premium rate, and Z is a random variable that represents the size of each claim. Suppose that an
insurance company is non-profitable with µ = 0, i.e. it uses all the premiums collected to cover
incoming claims. Also assume that the company is large enough to be considered “systemically
important”, so that when its surplus hits zero, the government will provide monetary support
to bring it back to positivity, as in the recent financial crisis. The dynamics of R is then a
Brownian motion reflected at the origin. Thus, (4.2) describes a real options problem in which
the management of a large non-profitable insurance company has the intention to liquidate or
sell the company, and would like to decide when to do so.
An unusual feature of (4.2) is that the discounted process {δ(s)v(Xxs )}s≥0 may not be a
supermartingale. This makes solving (4.2) for the optimal stopping time τ˜x, defined in (2.6)
with t = 0, nontrivial. As shown in Appendix B.1, we need an auxiliary value function, and use
the method of time-change in [24].
Proposition 4.1. For any x ∈ R+, the optimal stopping time τ˜x of (4.2) (defined in (2.6) with
t = 0) admits the explicit formula
(4.3) τ˜x = inf
{
s ≥ 0 : Xxs ≥
√
1/β + s
}
.
Hence, the naive stopping policy τ˜ ∈ T (R+), defined in (3.4), is given by
(4.4) τ˜(x) := 1
[0,
√
1/β)
(x) ∀x ∈ R+.
Proof. The proof is delegated to Appendix B.1.
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4.1 Characterization of equilibrium policies
Lemma 4.1. For any τ ∈ T (R+), consider τ ′ ∈ T (R+) with ker(τ ′) := ker(τ). Then L∗τ(x) =
Lτ(x) = Lτ ′(x) = L∗τ ′(x) for all x ∈ R+. Hence, τ ∈ E(R+) if and only if τ ′ ∈ E(R+).
Proof. If x ∈ R+ is in the interior of ker(τ), L∗τ(x) = Lτ(x) = 0 = Lτ ′(x) = L∗τ ′(x). Since
a one-dimensional Brownian motion W is monotone in no interval, if x ∈ ker(τ ′) \ ker(τ),
L∗τ(x) = Lτ(x) = 0 = Lτ ′(x) = L∗τ ′(x); if x /∈ ker(τ ′), then L∗τ(x) = Lτ(x) = inf{s ≥ 0 :
|W x| ∈ ker(τ)} = inf{s ≥ 0 : |W x| ∈ ker(τ)} = Lτ ′(x) = L∗τ ′(x). Finally, we deduce from
(3.13) and L∗τ(x) = L∗τ ′(x) for all x ∈ R+ that τ ∈ E(R+) implies τ ′ ∈ E(R+), and vice
versa.
The next result shows that every equilibrium policy corresponds to the hitting time to a
certain threshold. Recall that a set E ⊂ R+ is called totally disconnected if the only nonempty
connected subsets of E are singletons, i.e. E contains no interval.
Lemma 4.2. For any τ ∈ E(R+), define a := inf (ker(τ)) ≥ 0. Then, the Borel set E :=
{x ≥ a : x /∈ ker(τ)} is totally disconnected. Hence, ker(τ) = [a,∞) and the stopping policy τa,
defined by τa(x) := 1[0,a)(x) for x ∈ R+, belongs to E(R+).
Proof. The proof is delegated to Appendix B.2
The converse question is for which a ≥ 0 the policy τa ∈ T (R) is an equilibrium. To answer
this, we need to find the sets Sτa , Cτa , and Iτa in (3.13). By Definition 3.3,
(4.5) Lτa(x) = T xa := inf{s ≥ 0 : Xxs ≥ a}, L∗τa(x) = inf{s > 0 : Xxs ≥ a}.
Note that Lτa(x) = L∗τa(x), by an argument similar to the proof of Lemma 4.1. As a result,
for x ≥ a, we have J(x;L∗τa(x)) = J(x; 0) = x, which implies
(4.6) [a,∞) ⊆ Iτa .
For x ∈ [0, a), we need the lemma below, whose proof is delegated to Appendix B.3.
Lemma 4.3. Recall T xa in (4.5). On the space {(x, a) ∈ R2+ : a ≥ x}, define
η(x, a) := Ex
[
a
1 + βT xa
]
.
(i) For any a ≥ 0, x 7→ η(x, a) is strictly increasing and strictly convex on [0,a], and satisfies
0 < η(0, a) < a and η(a, a) = a.
(ii) For any x ≥ 0, η(x, a)→ 0 as a→∞.
(iii) There exists a unique a∗ ∈ (0, 1/√β) such that for any a > a∗, there is a unique solution
x∗(a) ∈ (0, a∗) of η(x, a) = x. Hence, η(x, a) > x for x < x∗(a) and η(x, a) < x for
x > x∗(a). On the other hand, a ≤ a∗ implies that η(x, a) > x for all x ∈ (0, a).
The figure below illustrates x 7→ η(x, a) under different scenarios a ≤ a∗ and a > a∗.
0
η(x, a)
a
a
x
a ≤ a∗
0
η(x, a)
a
ax∗(a)
x
a > a∗
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We now separate the case x ∈ [0, a) into two sub-cases:
1. If a ≤ a∗, Lemma 4.3 (iii) shows that J(x;L∗τa(x)) = η(x, a) > x, and thus
(4.7) [0, a) ⊆ Cτa .
2. If a > a∗, then by Lemma 4.3 (iii),
(4.8) J(x;L∗τa(x)) = η(x, a)

> x, if x ∈ [0, x∗(a)),
= x, if x = x∗(a),
< x, if x ∈ (x∗(a), a).
By (4.6), (4.7), (4.8), and the definition of Θ in (3.13),
if a ≤ a∗, Θτa(x) = 1[0,a)(x) + τa(x)1[a,∞)(x) ≡ τa(x);
if a > a∗, Θτa(x) = 1[0,x∗(a))(x) + τa(x)1{x∗(a)}∪[a,∞)(x) 6≡ τa(x).(4.9)
Proposition 4.2. τa defined in Lemma 4.2 belongs to E(R+) if and only if a ∈ [0, a∗], where
a∗ > 0 is characterized by a∗
∫∞
0 e
−s√2βs tanh(a∗√2βs)ds = 1. Moreover,
(4.10) E(R+) = {τ ∈ T (R+) : ker(τ) = [a,∞) for some a ∈ [0, a∗]}.
Proof. The derivation of “τa ∈ E(R+) ⇐⇒ a ∈ [0, a∗]” is presented in the discussion above
the proposition. By the proof of Lemma 4.3 in Appendix B.3, a∗ satisfies ηa(a∗, a∗) = 1,
which leads to the characterization of a∗. Now, for any τ ∈ T (R+) with ker(τ) = [a,∞) and
a ∈ [0, a∗], Lemma 4.1 implies τ ∈ E(R+). For any τ ∈ E(R+), set a := inf(ker(τ)). By
Lemma 4.2, ker(τ) = [a,∞) and τa ∈ E(R+). The latter implies a ∈ [0, a∗] and thus completes
the proof.
Remark 4.1 (Estimating a∗). With β = 1, numerical computation gives a∗ ≈ 0.946475. It
follows that for a general β > 0, a∗ ≈ 0.946475/√β.
For a > a∗, although τa /∈ E(R+) by Proposition 4.2, we may use the iteration in (3.8) to find
a stopping policy in E(R+). Here, the repetitive application of Θ to τa has a simple structure:
to reach an equilibrium, we need only one iteration.
Remark 4.2. Fix a > a∗, and recall x∗(a) ∈ (0, a∗) in Lemma 4.3 (iii). By (4.9),
Θτa(x) = τ
′
x∗(a)(x) := 1[0,x∗(a)](x) for all x ∈ R+.
Equivalently, ker(Θτa) = ker(τ
′
x∗(a)) = (x
∗(x),∞). Since ker(τ ′x∗(a)) = [x∗(a),∞) and x∗(a) ∈
(0, a∗), we conclude from (4.10) that τ ′x∗(a) ∈ E(R+).
Recall (3.12) which connects the naive and sophisticated behaviors. With the naive strategy
τ˜ ∈ T (R+) given explicitly in (4.4), Proposition 4.2 and Remark 4.1 imply τ˜ /∈ E(R+). We may
find the corresponding equilibrium as in Remark 4.2.
Remark 4.3. Set a˜ := 1/
√
β. By (4.4) and Remark 4.2, Θτ˜ = Θτa˜ = τ
′
x∗(a˜) ∈ E(R+). In
view of the proof of Lemma 4.3 in Appendix B.3, we can find x∗(a˜) by solving η(1/
√
β, x) = x,
i.e. 1√
β
∫∞
0 e
−s cosh(x
√
2βs) sech(
√
2s)ds = x, for x. Numerical computation shows x∗(a˜) ≈
0.92195/
√
β, and thus x∗(a˜) < a∗ by Remark 4.1. This verifies τ ′x∗(a˜) ∈ E(R+), thanks to (4.10).
Remark 4.4. Recall “static optimality” and “dynamic optimality” in Remarks 2.2 and 3.2. By
Proposition 4.1, τ˜x in (4.3) is statically optimal for x ∈ R+ fixed, while τ˜ in (4.4) is dynamically
optimal. This is reminiscent of the situation in Theorem 3 of [25]. Moreover, τ ∈ T (R+)
defined by τ(x) := 1[0,b)(x), x ∈ R+, is dynamically optimal for all b ≥
√
1/β, thanks again to
Proposition 4.1.
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4.2 Further consideration on selecting equilibrium policies
In view of (4.10), it is natural to ask which equilibrium in E(R+) one should employ. According
to standard Game Theory literature discussed below Corollary 3.1, a sophisticated agent should
employ the specific equilibrium generated by her initial stopping policy τ , through the iteration
(3.8). Now, imagine that an agent is “born” sophisticated: she does not have any previously-
determined initial stopping policy, and intends to apply an equilibrium policy straight away. A
potential way to formulate her stopping problem is the following:
(4.11) sup
τ∈E(R+)
J(x;Lτ(x)) = sup
a∈[0,a∗]
J(x;Lτa(x)) = sup
a∈[x,a∗∨x]
Ex
[
a
1 + βT xa
]
.
where the first equality follows from Proposition 4.2 and Lemma 4.1.
Proposition 4.3. τa∗ ∈ E(R+) solves (4.11) for all x ∈ R+.
Proof. Fix a ∈ [0, a∗). For any x ≤ a, we have T xa ≤ T xa∗ . Thus,
J(x;Lτa∗(x)) = Ex
[
a∗
1 + βT xa∗
]
= Ex
[
Ex
[
a∗
1 + βT xa∗
∣∣∣∣ FTxa ]]
≥ Ex
[
1
1 + βT xa
Ea
[
a∗
1 + βT aa∗
]]
> Ex
[
a
1 + βT xa
]
= J(x;Lτa(x)),
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 4.3 (iii).
The conclusion is twofold. First, it is possible, at least under current setting, to find one
single equilibrium policy that solves (4.11) for all x ∈ R+. Second, this “optimal” equilib-
rium policy τa∗ is different from τ
′
x∗(a˜), the equilibrium generated by the naive policy τ˜ (see
Remark 4.3). This indicates that the map Θ∗ := limn→∞Θn : T (X) 7→ E(X) is in general non-
linear: while τ˜ ∈ T (T ) is constructed from optimal stopping times {τ˜x}x∈R+ (or “dynamically
optimal” as in Remark 4.4), Θ∗(τ˜) = τ ′x∗(a˜) ∈ E(X) is not optimal under (4.11). This is not that
surprising once we realize τ˜x > Lτ˜(x) > Lτ ′x∗(a˜)(x) for some x ∈ R+. The first inequality is
essentially another way to describe time inconsistency, and the second inequality follows from
ker(τ˜ ) ⊂ ker(Θτ˜ ) = ker(τ ′x∗(a˜)). It follows that the optimality of τ˜x for supτ∈T J(x; τ) does not
necessarily translate to the optimality of τ ′x∗(a˜) for supτ∈E(R+) J(x;Lτ(x)).
A Proofs for Section 3
Throughout this appendix, we will constantly use the notation
(A.1) τn := Θ
nτ n ∈ N, for any τ ∈ T (X).
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Fix (t, x) ∈ X. We deal with the two cases τ˜(t, x) = 0 and τ˜ (t, x) = 1 separately. If τ˜(t, x) = 0,
i.e. τ˜t,x = t, by (2.7)
g(x) = sup
τ∈Tt
Et,x[δ(τ − t)g(Xτ )] ≥ Et,x
[
δ(L∗τ˜(t, x)− t)g(XL∗ τ˜(t,x))
]
,
which implies (t, x) ∈ Sτ˜ ∪ Iτ˜ . We then conclude from (3.7) that
Θτ˜(t, x) =
{
0 if (t, x) ∈ Sτ˜
τ˜(t, x) if (t, x) ∈ Iτ˜ = τ˜(t, x).
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If τ˜(t, x) = 1, then L∗τ˜(t, x) = Lτ˜(t, x) = inf{s ≥ t : τ˜(s,Xt,xs ) = 0} = inf{s ≥ t : τ˜s,Xt,xs =
s}. By (2.6) and (2.5), τ˜s,Xt,xs = s means
g(Xt,xs (ω)) = ess sup
τ∈Ts
Es,X
t,x
s (ω)[δ(τ − s)g(Xτ )],
which is equivalent to
δ(s − t)g(Xt,xs (ω)) = δ(s − t) ess sup
τ∈Ts
Es,X
t,x
s (ω)[δ(τ − s)g(Xτ )]
= ess sup
τ∈Ts
Es,X
t,x
s (ω)[δ(τ − t)g(Xτ )] = Zt,xs (ω),
where the second equality follows from (2.8). We then conclude that L∗τ˜(t, x) = inf{s ≥ t :
δ(s − t)g(Xt,xs ) = Zt,xs } = τ˜t,x. This, together with (2.7), shows that
Et,x
[
δ(L∗τ˜(t, x)− t)g(XL∗ τ˜(t,x))
]
= Et,x
[
δ(τ˜t,x − t)g(Xτ˜t,x)
]
≥ g(x),
which implies (t, x) ∈ Iτ˜ ∪ Cτ˜ . By (3.7), we have
Θτ˜(t, x) =
{
τ˜(t, x) if (t, x) ∈ Iτ˜
1 if (t, x) ∈ Cτ˜ = τ˜(t, x).
We therefore have Θτ˜(t, x) = τ˜(t, x) for all (t, x) ∈ X, i.e. τ˜ ∈ E(X).
A.2 Derivation of Proposition 3.2
To prove the technical result Lemma A.1 below, we need to introduce shifted random variables
as formulated in Nutz [22]. For any t ≥ 0 and ω ∈ Ω, we define the concatenation of ω and
ω˜ ∈ Ω at time t by
(ω ⊗t ω˜)s := ωs1[0,t)(s) + [ω˜s − (ω˜t − ωt)]1[t,∞)(s), s ≥ 0.
For any F∞-measurable random variable ξ : Ω 7→ R, we define the shifted random variable
[ξ]t,ω : Ω 7→ R, which is F t∞-measurable, by
[ξ]t,ω(ω˜) := ξ(ω ⊗t ω˜), ∀ω˜ ∈ Ω.
Given τ ∈ T , we write ω ⊗τ(ω) ω˜ as ω ⊗τ ω˜, and [ξ]τ(ω),ω(ω˜) as [ξ]τ,ω(ω˜). A detailed analysis of
shifted random variables can be found in [3, Appendix A]; Proposition A.1 therein implies that
give (t, x) ∈ X fixed, any θ ∈ Tt and F t∞-measurable ξ with Et,x[|ξ|] <∞ satisfy
(A.2) Et,x[ξ | F tθ](ω) = Et,x [[ξ]θ,ω] for a.e. ω ∈ Ω.
Lemma A.1. For any τ ∈ T (X) and (t, x) ∈ X, define t0 := L∗τ1(t, x) ∈ Tt and s0 :=
L∗τ(t, x) ∈ Tt, with τ1 as in (A.1). If t0 ≤ s0, then for a.e. ω ∈ {t < t0},
g(Xt,xt0 (ω)) ≤ Et,x
[
δ(s0 − t0)g(Xs0) | F tt0
]
(ω).
Proof. For a.e. ω ∈ {t < t0} ∈ Ft, we deduce from t0(ω) = L∗τ1(t, x)(ω) > t that for all
s ∈ (t, t0(ω)) we have τ1(s,Xt,xs (ω)) = 1 . By (A.1) and (3.7), this implies (s,Xt,xs (ω)) /∈ Sτ for
all s ∈ (t, t0(ω)). Thus,
g(Xt,xs (ω)) ≤ Es,X
t,x
s (ω)
[
δ(L∗τ(s,Xs)− s)g
(
XL∗τ(s,Xs)
)]
∀s ∈ (t, t0(ω)) .(A.3)
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For any s ∈ (t, t0(ω)), note that
[t0]s,ω(ω˜) = t0(ω ⊗s ω˜) = L∗τ1(t, x)(ω ⊗s ω˜) = L∗τ1(s,Xt,xs (ω))(ω˜),
∀ ω˜ ∈ Ω. Since t0 ≤ s0, similar calculation gives [s0]s,ω(ω˜) = L∗τ(s,Xt,xs (ω))(ω˜). We thus
conclude from (A.3) that
g(Xt,xs (ω)) ≤ Es,X
t,x
s (ω)
[
δ([s0]s,ω − s)g
(
[Xs0 ]s,ω
)]
≤ Es,Xt,xs (ω) [δ([s0]s,ω − [t0]s,ω)g ([Xs0 ]s,ω)] , ∀s ∈ (t, t0(ω)) ,(A.4)
where the second line holds because δ is decreasing and also δ and g are both nonnegative. On
the other hand, by (A.2), it holds a.s. that
Et,x[δ(s0 − t0)g(Xs0) | F ts](ω) = Et,x
[
δ([s0]s,ω − [t0]s,ω)g([Xt,xs0 ]s,ω)
] ∀s ≥ t, s ∈ Q.
Note that we used the countability of Q to obtain the above almost-sure statement. This,
together with (A.4), shows that it holds a.s. that
(A.5) g(Xt,xs (ω)) 1{(t,t0(ω))∩Q}(s) ≤ Et,x[δ(s0 − t0)g(Xs0) | F ts](ω) 1{(t,t0(ω))∩Q}(s).
Since our sample space Ω is the canonical space for Brownian motion with the right-continuous
Brownian filtration F, the martingale representation theorem holds under current setting. This
in particular implies that every martingale has a continuous version. Let {Ms}s≥t be the
continuous version of the martingale {Et,x[δ(s0 − t0)g(Xs0) | F ts]}s≥t. Then, (A.5) immediately
implies that it holds a.s. that
(A.6) g(Xt,xs (ω)) 1{(t,t0(ω))∩Q}(s) ≤Ms(ω) 1{(t,t0(ω))∩Q}(s).
Also, using the right-continuity of M and (A.2), one can show that for any τ ∈ Tt, Mτ =
Et,x[δ(s0− t0)g(Xs0) | F tτ ] a.s. Now, we can take some Ω∗ ∈ F∞ with P[Ω∗] = 1 such that for all
ω ∈ Ω∗, (A.6) holds true andMt0(ω) = Et,x[δ(s0−t0)g(Xs0) | F tt0 ](ω). For any ω ∈ Ω∗∩{t < t0},
take {kn} ⊂ Q such that kn > t and kn ↑ t0(ω). Then, (A.6) implies g(Xt,xkn (ω)) ≤Mkn(ω), ∀n ∈
N. As n → ∞, we obtain from the continuity of s 7→ Xs and z 7→ g(z), and the left-continuity
of s 7→Ms that g(Xt,xt0 (ω)) ≤Mt0(ω) = Et,x[δ(s0 − t0)g(Xs0) | F tt0 ](ω).
Now, we are ready to prove Proposition 3.2.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. We will prove (3.11) by induction. We know that the result holds for
n = 0 by (3.10). Now, assume that (3.11) holds for n = k ∈ N ∪ {0}, and we intend to show
that (3.11) also holds for n = k + 1. Recall the notation in (A.1). Fix (t, x) ∈ ker(τk+1), i.e.
τk+1(t, x) = 0. If L∗τk+1(t, x) = t, then (t, x) belongs to Iτk+1 . By (3.7), we get τk+2(t, x) =
Θτk+1(t, x) = τk+1(t, x) = 0, and thus (t, x) ∈ ker(τk+2), as desired. We therefore assume below
that L∗τk+1(t, x) > t.
By (3.7), τk+1(t, x) = 0 implies
(A.7) g(x) ≥ Et,x[δ(L∗τk(t, x)− t)g(XL∗τk(t,x))].
Let t0 := L∗τk+1(t, x) and s0 := L∗τk(t, x). Under the induction hypothesis ker(τk) ⊆ ker(τk+1),
we have t0 ≤ s0, as t0 and s0 are hitting times to ker(τk+1) and ker(τk), respectively; see (3.5).
Using (A.7), t0 ≤ s0, Assumption 3.1, and g being nonnegative,
g(x) ≥ Et,x[δ(s0 − t)g(Xs0)] ≥ Et,x[δ(t0 − t)δ(s0 − t0)g(Xs0)]
= Et,x
[
δ(t0 − t)Et,x
[
δ(s0 − t0)g(Xs0) | F tt0
]]
≥ Et,x [δ(t0 − t)g(Xt0)] ,
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where the second line follows from the tower property of conditional expectations, and the third
line is due to Lemma A.1. This implies (t, x) /∈ Cτk+1 , and thus
(A.8) τk+2(t, x) =
{
0 for (t, x) ∈ Sτ1
τk+1(t, x) for (t, x) ∈ Iτ1
= 0.
That is, (t, x) ∈ ker(τk+2). Thus, we conclude that ker(τk+1) ⊆ ker(τk+2), as desired.
It remains to show that τ0 defined in (3.8) is a stopping policy. Observe that for any
(t, x) ∈ X, τ0(t, x) = 0 if and only if Θnτ(t, x) = 0, i.e. (t, x) ∈ ker(Θnτ), for n large enough.
This, together with (3.11), implies that
{(t, x) ∈ X : τ0(t, x) = 0} =
⋃
n∈N
ker(Θnτ) ∈ B(X).
Hence, τ0 : X 7→ {0, 1} is Borel measurable, and thus an element in T (X).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Fix (t, x) ∈ ker(τ˜ ). Since τ˜(t, x) = 0, i.e. τ˜t,x = t, (2.6), (2.5), and (2.7) imply
g(x) = sup
τ∈Tt
Et,x[δ(τ − t)g(Xτ )] ≥ Et,x
[
δ(L∗τ˜(t, x)− t)g(XL∗ τ˜(t,x))
]
.
This shows that (t, x) ∈ Sτ˜ ∪ Iτ˜ . Thus, we have ker(τ˜) ⊆ Sτ˜ ∪ Iτ˜ . It follows that
ker(τ˜) = (ker(τ˜) ∩ Sτ˜ ) ∪ (ker(τ˜ ) ∩ Iτ˜ ) ⊆ Sτ˜ ∪ (ker(τ˜) ∩ Iτ˜ ) = ker(Θτ˜ ),
where the last equality follows from (3.7).
A.4 Derivation of Theorem 3.1
Lemma A.2. Suppose Assumption 3.1 holds and τ ∈ T (X) satisfies (3.10). Then τ0 defined in
(3.8) satisfies
L∗τ0(t, x) = lim
n→∞L
∗Θnτ(t, x), ∀(t, x) ∈ X.
Proof. We will use the notation in (A.1). Recall that ker(τn) ⊆ ker(τn+1) for all n ∈ N and
ker(τ0) =
⋃
n∈N ker(τn) from Proposition 3.2. By (3.5), this implies that {L∗τn(t, x)}n∈N is a
nonincreasing sequence of stopping times, and
L∗τ0(t, x) ≤ t0 := lim
n→∞L
∗τn(t, x).
It remains to show that L∗τ0(t, x) ≥ t0. We deal with the following two cases.
(i) On {ω ∈ Ω : L∗τ0(t, x)(ω) = t}: By (3.5), there must exist a sequence {tm}m∈N in
R+, depending on ω ∈ Ω, such that tm ↓ t and τ0(tm,Xt,xtm (ω)) = 0 for all m ∈ N. For
each m ∈ N, by the definition of τ0 in (3.8), there exists n∗ ∈ N large enough such that
τn∗(tm,X
t,x
tm (ω)) = 0, which implies L∗τn∗(t, x)(ω) ≤ tm. Since {L∗τn(t, x)}n∈N is nonincreasing,
we have t0(ω) ≤ L∗τn∗(t, x)(ω) ≤ tm. With m→∞, we get t0(ω) ≤ t = L∗τ0(t, x)(ω).
(ii) On {ω ∈ Ω : L∗τ0(t, x)(ω) > t}: Set s0 := L∗τ0(t, x). If τ0(s0(ω),Xt,xs0 (ω)) = 0, then by
(3.8) there exists n∗ ∈ N large enough such that τn∗(s0(ω),Xt,xs0 (ω)) = 0. Since {L∗τn(t, x)}n∈N
is nonincreasing, t0(ω) ≤ L∗τn∗(t, x)(ω) ≤ s0(ω), as desired. If τ0(s0(ω),Xt,xs0 (ω)) = 1, then by
(3.5) there exist a sequence {tm}m∈N in R+, depending on ω ∈ Ω, such that tm ↓ s0(ω) and
τ0(tm,X
t,x
tm (ω)) = 0 for all m ∈ N. Then we can argue as in case (i) to show that t0(ω) ≤ s0(ω),
as desired.
Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 3.1.
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Proof of Theorem 3.1. By Proposition 3.2, τ0 ∈ T (X) is well-defined. For simplicity, we will
use the notation in (A.1). Fix (t, x) ∈ X. If τ0(t, x) = 0, by (3.8) we have τn(t, x) =
0 for n large enough. Since τn(t, x) = Θτn−1(t, x), we deduce from “τn(t, x) = 0 for n
large enough” and (3.7) that (t, x) ∈ Sτn−1 ∪ Iτn−1 for n large enough. That is, g(x) ≥
Et,x
[
δ(L∗τn−1(t, x)− t)g(XL∗τn−1(t,x))
]
for n large enough. With n → ∞, the dominated con-
vergence theorem and Lemma A.2 yield
g(x) ≥ Et,x [δ(L∗τ0(t, x)− t)g(XL∗τ0(t,x))] ,
which shows that (t, x) ∈ Sτ0 ∪ Iτ0 . We then deduce from (3.7) and τ0(t, x) = 0 that Θτ0(t, x) =
τ0(t, x). On the other hand, if τ0(t, x) = 1, by (3.8) we have τn(t, x) = 1 for n large enough.
Since τn(t, x) = Θτn−1(t, x), we deduce from “τn(t, x) = 1 for n large enough” and (3.7) that
(t, x) ∈ Cτn−1 ∪ Iτn−1 for n large enough. That is,
g(x) ≤ Et,x [δ(L∗τn−1(t, x)− t)g(XL∗τn−1(t,x))] for n large enough.
With n→∞, the dominated convergence theorem and Lemma A.2 yield
g(x) ≤ Et,x [δ(L∗τ0(t, x)− t)g(XL∗τ0(t,x))] ,
which shows that (t, x) ∈ Cτ0 ∪ Iτ0 . We then deduce from (3.7) and τ0(t, x) = 1 that Θτ0(t, x) =
τ0(t, x). We therefore conclude that τ0 ∈ E(X).
B Proofs for Section 4
B.1 Derivation of Proposition 4.1
In the classical case of exponential discounting, (2.8) ensures that for all s ≥ 0,
(B.1) δ(s)v(Xxs ) = sup
τ∈T
EX
x
s [δ(s + τ)g(Xτ )] = sup
τ∈Ts
Ex [δ(τ)g(Xτ ) | Fs] ,
which shows that {δ(s)v(Xxs )}s≥0 is a supermartingale. Under hyperbolic discounting (4.1),
since δ(r1)δ(r2) < δ(r1+r2) for all r1, r2 ≥ 0, {δ(s)v(Xxs )}s≥t may no longer be a supermatingale,
as the first equality in the above equation fails.
To overcome this, we introduce the auxiliary value function: for (s, x) ∈ R2+,
V (s, x) := sup
τ∈T
Ex [δ(s + τ)g(Xτ )] = sup
τ∈T
Ex
[
Xτ
1 + β(s+ τ)
]
.(B.2)
By definition, V (0, x) = v(x), and {V (s,Xxs )}s≥0 is a supermartingale as V (s,Xxs ) is equal to
the right hand side of (B.1).
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Recall that Xs = |Ws| for a one-dimensional Brownian motion W .
Let y ∈ R be the initial value of W , and define V¯ (s, y) := V (s, |y|). The associated variational
inequality for V¯ (s, y) is the following: for (s, y) ∈ [0,∞) ×R,
(B.3) min
{
ws(s, y) +
1
2
wyy(s, y), w(s, y) − |y|
1 + βs
}
= 0.
Taking s 7→ b(s) as the free boundary to be determined, we can rewrite (B.3) as
(B.4)
{
ws(s, y) +
1
2wyy(s, y) = 0, w(s, y) >
|y|
1+βs , for |y| < b(s);
w(s, y) = |y|1+βs , for |y| ≥ b(s).
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Following [24], we propose the ansatz w(s, y) = 1√
1+βs
h( y√
1+βs
). Equation (B.4) then becomes
a one-dimensional free boundary problem:
(B.5)
{
−βzh′(z) + h′′(z) = βh(z), h(z) > |z|, for |z| < b(s)√
1+βs
;
h(z) = |z|, for |z| ≥ b(s)√
1+βs
.
Since the variable s does not appear in the above ODE, we take b(s) = α
√
1 + βs for some
α ≥ 0. The general solution of the first line of (B.5) is
h(z) = e
β
2
z2
(
c1 + c2
√
2
β
∫ √β/2z
0
e−u
2
du
)
, (c1, c2) ∈ R2 .
The second line of (B.5) gives h(α) = α. We then have
w(s, y) =

e
βy2
2(1+βs)√
1+βs
(
c1 + c2
√
2
β
∫ √β/2y√
1+βs
0 e
−u2du
)
, |y| < α√1 + βs;
|y|
1+βs , |y| ≥ α
√
1 + βs.
To find the parameters c1, c2 and α, we equate the partial derivatives of (s, y) 7→ w(s, y) obtained
on both sides of the free boundary. This yields the equations
α = e
β
2
α2
(
c1 + c2
√
2
β
∫ √β/2α
0
e−u
2
du
)
and sgn(x)− c2 = sgn(x)α2β.
The last equation implies c2 = 0. This, together with the first equation, shows that α = 1/
√
β
and c1 = αe
−1/2. Thus, we obtain
(B.6) w(s, y) =
{
1√
β
√
1+βs
exp
(
1
2
(
βy2
1+βs − 1
))
, |y| <√1/β + s,
|y|
1+βs , |y| ≥
√
1/β + s.
Note that w(s, y) > |y|1+βs for |y| <
√
1/β + s. Indeed, by defining the function h(y) :=
1√
β
√
1+βs
exp
(
1
2
(
βy2
1+βs − 1
))
− y1+βs and observing that h(0) > 0, h(
√
1/β + s) = 0, and
h′(y) < 11+βs− 11+βs = 0 for all y ∈ (0,
√
1/β + s), we conclude h(y) > 0 for all y ∈ [0,√1/β + s),
or w(s, y) > |y|1+βs for |y| <
√
1/β + s. Also note that w is C1,1 on [0,+∞)×R, and C1,2 on the
domain {(s, y) ∈ [0,∞) × R : |y| <√1/β + s}. Moreover, by (B.6), ws(s, y) + 12wyy(s, y) < 0
for |y| > √1/β + s). We then conclude from the standard verification theorem (see e.g.
[23, Theorem 3.2]) that V¯ (s, y) = w(s, y) is a smooth solution of (B.4). This implies that
{V¯ (s,W ys )}s≥0 is a supermartingale, and {V¯ (s ∧ τ∗y ,W ys∧τ∗y )}s≥0 is a true martingale, with
τ∗y := inf{s ≥ 0 : |W ys | ≥
√
1/β + s}. It then follows from standard arguments that τ∗y is
the smallest optimal stopping time of V¯ (0, y), and thus τˆx := inf{s ≥ 0 : Xxs ≥
√
1/β + s} is
the smallest optimal stopping time of (4.2). In view of Proposition 2.1, τ˜x = τˆx.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 4.2
First, we prove that E is totally disconnected. If ker(τ) = [a,∞), then E = ∅ and there is
nothing to prove. Assume that there exists x∗ > a such that x∗ /∈ ker(τ). Define
ℓ := sup {b ∈ ker(τ) : b < x∗} and u := inf {b ∈ ker(τ) : b > x∗} .
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We claim that ℓ = u = x∗. Assume to the contrary ℓ < u. Then τ(x) = 1 for all x ∈ (ℓ, u).
Thus, given y ∈ (ℓ, u), L∗τ(y) = T y := inf{s ≥ 0 : Xys /∈ (ℓ, u)} > 0, and
(B.7) J(y;L∗τ(y)) = Ey
[
XT y
1 + βT y
]
< Ey[XT y ] = ℓP[XT y = ℓ] + uP[XT y = u].
Since Xs = |Ws| for a one-dimensional Brownian motion W and 0 < ℓ < y < u, by the
optional sampling theorem P[XT y = ℓ] = P[W
y
s hits ℓ before hitting u] =
u−y
u−ℓ and P[XT y =
u] = P[W ys hits u before hitting ℓ] =
y−ℓ
u−ℓ . This, together with (B.7), gives J(y;L∗τ(y)) < y.
This implies y ∈ Sτ , and thus Θτ(y) = 0 by (3.13). Then Θτ(y) 6= τ(y), a contradiction to
τ ∈ E(R+). This already implies that E is totally disconnected, and thus ker(τ) = [a,∞). The
rest of the proof follows from Lemma 4.1.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 4.3
(i) Given a ≥ 0, it is obvious from definition that η(0, a) ∈ (0, a) and η(a, a) = a. Fix x ∈ (0, a),
and let fxa denote the density of T
x
a . We obtain
Ex
[
1
1 + βT xa
]
=
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + βt
fxa (t)dt =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
e−(1+βt)sfxa (t)ds dt
=
∫ ∞
0
e−s
(∫ ∞
0
e−βstfxa (t)dt
)
ds =
∫ ∞
0
e−sEx[e−βsT
x
a ]ds.
(B.8)
Since T xa is the first hitting time of a one-dimensional Bessel process, we compute its Laplace
transform using Theorem 3.1 of [17] (or Formula 2.0.1 on p. 361 of [7]):
(B.9) Ex
[
e−
λ2
2
Txa
]
=
√
xI− 1
2
(xλ)
√
aI− 1
2
(aλ)
= cosh(xλ) sech(aλ), for x ≤ a.
Here, Iν denotes the modified Bessel function of the first kind. Thanks to the above formula
with λ =
√
2βs, we obtain from (B.8) that
(B.10) η(x, a) = a
∫ ∞
0
e−s cosh(x
√
2βs) sech(a
√
2βs)ds.
It is then obvious that x 7→ η(x, a) is strictly increasing. Moreover,
ηxx(x, a) = 2aβ
2
∫ ∞
0
e−ss cosh(x
√
2βs) sech(a
√
2βs)ds > 0 for x ∈ [0, a],
which shows the strict convexity.
(ii) This follows from (B.10) and the dominated convergence theorem.
(iii) We will first prove the desired result with x∗(a) ∈ (0, a), and then upgrade it to x∗(a) ∈
(0, a∗). Fix a ≥ 0. In view of the properties in (i), we observe that the two curves y = η(x, a)
and y = x intersect at some x∗(a) ∈ (0, a) if and only if ηx(a, a) > 1. Define k(a) := ηx(a, a).
By (B.10),
(B.11) k(a) = a
∫ ∞
0
e−s
√
2βs tanh(a
√
2βs)ds.
Thus, we see that k(0) = 0 and k(a) is strictly increasing on (0, 1), since for any a > 0,
k′(a) =
∫ ∞
0
e−s
√
2s
(
tanh(a
√
2s) +
a
√
2s
cosh2(a
√
2s)
)
ds > 0.
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By numerical computation, k(1/
√
β) =
∫∞
0 e
−s√2s tanh(√2s)ds ≈ 1.07461 > 1. It follows that
there must exist a∗ ∈ (0, 1/√β) such that k(a∗) = ηx(a∗, a∗) = 1. Monotonicity of k(a) then
gives the desired result.
Now, for any a > a∗, we intend to upgrade the previous result to x∗(a) ∈ (0, a∗). Fix x ≥ 0.
By the definition of η and (ii), on the domain a ∈ [x,∞), the map a 7→ η(x, a) must either first
increases and then decreases to 0, or directly decreases down to 0. From (B.10), we have
ηa(x, x) = 1− x
∫ ∞
0
e−s
√
2βs tanh(x
√
2βs)ds = 1− k(x),
with k as in (B.11). Recalling k(a∗) = 1, we have ηa(a∗, a∗) = 0. Notice that
ηaa(a
∗, a∗) = − 2
a∗
k(a∗)− 2βa∗ + a∗
∫ ∞
0
4βse−s tanh2(a∗
√
2βs)ds
≤ − 2
a∗
+ 2βa∗ < 0,
where the second line follows from tanh(x) ≤ 1 for x ≥ 0 and a∗ ∈ (0, 1/√β). Since ηa(a∗, a∗) =
0 and ηaa(a
∗, a∗) < 0, we conclude that on the domain a ∈ [a∗,∞), the map a 7→ η(a∗, a)
decreases down to 0. Now, for any a > a∗, since η(a∗, a) < η(a∗, a∗) = a∗, we must have
x∗(a) < a∗.
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